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Abstract: 
Experimental evidence reveals that there is a strong willingness to trust and to act in both 
positively and negatively reciprocal ways. So far it is rarely analyzed whether these variables 
of social cognition influence everyday decision making behavior. We focus on entrepreneurs 
who are permanently facing exchange processes in the interplay with investors, sellers, and 
buyers, as well as needing to trust others and reciprocate with their network. We base our 
analysis on the German Socio-Economic Panel and recently introduced questions about trust, 
positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity to examine the extent that these variables 
influence the entrepreneurial decision processes. More specifically, we analyze whether i) the 
willingness to trust other people influences the probability of starting a business; ii) trust, 
positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity influence the exit probability of entrepreneurs; 
and iii) willingness to trust and to act reciprocally influences the probability of being an 
entrepreneur versus an employee or a manager. Our findings reveal that, in particular, trust 
impacts entrepreneurial development. Interestingly, entrepreneurs are more trustful than 
employees, but much less trustful than managers. 
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I.  Introduction 
A large number of economic experiments reveal that the majority of participants in these 
experiments show willingness for trust, positive and negative reciprocity despite the fact that 
these decisions are both risky and costly. Such behavior is observed in controlled 
experimental settings, for instance in the Trust Game (see Berg, Dickhaut and Mc Cabe, 1995, 
Bolle, 1998), in the Gift Exchange Game (see e.g. Fehr, Gächter, Kirchsteiger, 1997) or in the 
Ultimatum Game (see e.g. Güth, 1995, Kritikos and Bolle, 2001). Consequently experimental 
economists state that the self-interested individual utility function of payoff maximization is 
not accurate for describing human behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). 
Thus, trust and reciprocity are important personality traits that influence participant 
behavior. However, there are only few empirical tests evaluating the extent that willingness 
for trust and reciprocity influences real world economic outcomes. Therefore, in this paper we 
examine the question whether individuals who have such specific personality traits as a 
willingness to trust others and to positively or negatively reciprocate toward others are more 
likely to become entrepreneurs, be entrepreneurs, and stay in entrepreneurship. 
We focus on entrepreneurs because entrepreneurs are considered, in economics, as the 
egoistic actors. At the same time, entrepreneurs are constantly facing exchange processes in 
the interplay with investors, sellers, and buyers. Unlike employees, who find themselves part 
of comparatively stable organizational structures, entrepreneurial activities take place among 
a huge variety of frequently changing relationships. Entrepreneurs must make choices 
between many social action alternatives where these three variables of social cognition may 
influence their decision making processes. Consequently, it is important to find out how 
entrepreneurs score in these parameter characteristics and whether the specific scores 
influence entrepreneurial decisions? 
From a more general point of view, there is increasing interest in the relationship 
between personality characteristics and economic outcomes of entrepreneurs. For instance 
Zhao and Seibert (2006) made use of the “Big Five” personality construct indicating that 
entrepreneurs scored higher than managers on four different personality dimensions which 
make them conclude that the personality structure may be considered as one important 
component in explaining new venture creation and entrepreneurial success. In addition, there 
are several approaches focusing on the impact of special personality traits on entrepreneurial 
development. For instance, Oosterbeek, van Praag and Ijsselstein (2010) show that Locus of 
Control positively influences entrepreneurial survival and Caliendo, Fossen and Kritikos 
(2010) find an inverse u-shaped impact of risk attitudes on entrepreneurial survival. The 
present approach adds in a complementary way to the existing analysis of the influence of 
personality characteristics on entrepreneurial decisions as it focuses on new variables of social 
cognition the impact of which has not been analyzed so far.    2
In our analysis, we use a large, representative data set, the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (SOEP). The 2003, 2005, and 2008 waves contain several questions with respect to 
these variables of social cognition. Trust is measured as the willingness to be trustful to others 
and as the assessment of the same individual on the trustworthiness of others. Fehr et al. 
(2002) tested the survey measures of trust using a large-scale field experiment where subjects 
took part in a paid trust game and answered the survey questions on trust. The results indicate 
that the survey measures predict actual trust behavior reliably. Furthermore, the 2005 SOEP 
wave contains questions about, positive reciprocity, the willingness to return favors, and 
negative reciprocity, the willingness to harm those who previously harmed the surveyed 
individual. Based on these data, we examine the influence of these variables on 
entrepreneurial entry and exit decisions. To consistently answer the questions, we control for 
previous labor market states of all entrepreneurs in the sample, and for other variables which 
have proven to be important in previous analysis (see e.g. Caliendo et al., 2009, 2010). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the relationship 
between social cognition and entrepreneurial entry and survival. We describe the data in 
Section 3 with a special focus on the various measures of social cognition used in our 
analysis. Section 4 presents the results of our analysis, before Section 5 concludes. Our 
empirical results provide first evidence that entrepreneurs trust more and that trust 
significantly influences the probability to enter self-employment. The influence of reciprocity 
is below the expectations raised by experimental economists. The empirical analysis makes 
also clear that we need differentiated concepts of trust as used here to facilitate a clear picture 
of this complex personality characteristic on entrepreneurial development.  
 
II.  Theoretical and Empirical Background 
The ability to create social networks is widely believed to be a crucial prerequisite for 
becoming a successful entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs need to delegate tasks to trustworthy 
people, to negotiate with suppliers, employees, and customers about prices, quantities, and 
qualities of inputs, products, and services while maintaining cooperative relationships with all 
business partners and clients. One way to approach the ability to interact in networks is to 
analyze the willingness to trust others and to act reciprocally toward others. 
In the entrepreneurial context trust as a personality characteristic relates to questions 
about the extent entrepreneurs believe that they can trust and rely on others. Being able to 
trust other people is an important prerequisite for realizing exchange processes in a business, 
especially when it is newly created and when the legal environment of the business, for 
instance in terms of complete contracts, is not (fully) established. Trust starts with selecting 
and delegating tasks to trustworthy people (Logan, 2009) and turns over to the willingness of 
the entrepreneur to trust (potential) business partners, such as suppliers, investors, and clients.   3
It is important to note that mutual trust between trading partners allows for profitable 
transactions in particular when business relationships cannot be secured by fully enforceable 
contracts. Therefore we suggest that people who are unwilling to rely on others will be less 
able to start and run their own business, while having some level of willingness to trust may 
ease to take on the risks of entrepreneurship. Earlier evidence in this direction is provided by 
La Porta et al. (1997) showing that trusting entrepreneurs are better able to grow firms larger. 
On the other hand, trust also contains a risk factor (see e.g. Eckel and Wilson, 2004). 
Excessively trusting other people includes the possibility that a trustful person is more likely 
to be exploited if the trustee is an opportunistic individual. In case of exploitation, 
entrepreneurs may also suffer serious consequences when they lose business ideas or profit 
opportunities and are confronted with financial losses. This means we should expect that 
entrepreneurs unboundedly trusting others face an increasing probability of exploitation 
leading with higher probability to losses when compared to less trustful persons. A similar 
argument by Butler et al. (2009), using European Social Survey data, shows an inverse-U 
shaped relationship between the willingness to trust and the ability to create higher incomes. 
Thus, unlimited trust tends to be exploited by the trustees.  
(H1: Trust) Therefore, we hypothesize with respect to the trust variable that: 
(a) the more trustful an individual is, the higher the entry probability as an entrepreneur,  
(b) trustful persons have a higher probability to be an entrepreneur,  
(c) entrepreneurs with either low or high willingness to trust others will have a lower 
probability to successfully develop their businesses than entrepreneurs whose willingness 
to trust others falls in a middle range. 
In our empirical analysis, we will make further comparisons between different subgroups 
of people, such as between entrepreneurs and managers, or within the entrepreneurs between 
those with and without employees. However, we will not provide any further hypothesis for 
the comparison of these subgroups. By doing so, we rather aim to explore and further 
understand what kind of influence different parameter values of the trust variable has on 
entrepreneurial decisions.  
Reciprocity is the intrinsic motivation to respond to the behavior of a related person. The 
concept of reciprocity is divided in two opposing aspects, namely positive reciprocity and 
negative reciprocity: positive (negative) reciprocity is the intention of rewarding (punishing) 
those who have been kind (mean) to us. Both decisions i.e. reward and punishment may 
reduce a person’s payoff, while the payoff of the rewarded (punished) person will increase   4
(decrease). Reciprocal choices are, thus, based on the history of the exchange process and 
have direct consequences for the outcomes of the two parties.
4 
For entrepreneurs whose activities are based on exchanges of factors, knowledge, and 
products, it is one of the essential prerequisites to develop networks and social interactions. 
Having willingness for positive reciprocity could be helpful for entrepreneurial activities as 
all exchange processes between entrepreneurs and their networks implicitly contain reciprocal 
actions (Baron and Markman, 2000). Cooperation based on positive reciprocity might, 
therefore, be of importance in maintaining and developing business relationships when 
contracts are not or only partially enforceable. Moreover, Cable and Shane (1997) propose 
that cooperation in terms of positive reciprocity might be a key factor in the entrepreneur’s 
ability to get access to venture capital or develop alliances with larger companies.
5 
Negative reciprocity is the opposite of having a forgiving nature. In the context of 
bargaining, it might be important to support one’s own bargaining position by offending 
people in response to their previous offence (McClelland and Boyatzis, 1982). Therefore, as 
the realization of financial margins by hard bargaining might be a crucial prerequisite for 
entrepreneurial success (in terms of higher income) and as weak bargaining positions might 
have serious consequences for entrepreneurs, negative reciprocity could be beneficial. 
At the same time, high levels of positive and negative reciprocity may inhibit 
entrepreneurial success. A high willingness for positive reciprocity, where one is willing to 
undergo high personal costs in order to help somebody in return for his or her help, might 
substantially reduce own profits. A high willingness for negative reciprocity, i.e. one is ready 
to take revenge, no matter what it costs, might not only reduce own profits but also lead to 
situations where others perceive such behavior as non-cooperative. Other market agents may 
conclude that it is not worth doing business with such entrepreneurs. Putting the pieces 
together, we should expect that, up to a certain level, both positive reciprocity and negative 
reciprocity will help to maintain and further develop entrepreneurial activities. With respect to 
the entry decision of entrepreneurs we should, however, expect no influence.  
(H2: Reciprocity) Therefore, we hypothesize with respect to reciprocity that  
(a) among all entrepreneurs, people with very low or very high willingness for positive or 
negative reciprocity have a higher exit probability from their entrepreneurial activities than 
people who have a medium score on positive or negative reciprocity. 
                                                 
4 Research by Dohmen et al. (2008, p. 85) reveals that both types of reciprocal behavior are observed in the 
population and that “positive and negative reciprocity turn out to be only weakly correlated for individuals, 
which suggests that these are distinct traits rather than two sides of the same coin.” 
5 Positive reciprocity may also contain another aspect, namely correlations to a related personality trait, i.e. 
interpersonal reactivity, which is also of relevance for entrepreneurial activities. ‘Interpersonal reactivity’ 
describes the ability to put oneself in the place of others. In the context of entrepreneurship, it expresses the 
ability to approach other people and develop rewarding relationships with them (see, e.g., Müller and Gappisch, 
2005). A sufficient level of ‘interpersonal reactivity’ should better enable the entrepreneur to produce client-
oriented products (see Caliendo and Kritikos, 2008).    5
(b) positive and negative reciprocity do not influence the entry decision of entrepreneurs. 
Again, we will make comparisons between subgroups for both reciprocity variables to 
further explore the influence of reciprocity on entrepreneurial development.  
 
III.  Data 
III.1. Representative Household Panel Data 
We base our analysis on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), an established, 
representative panel survey containing detailed information about the personal, household and 
socio-economic situation of approximately 22,000 individuals living in 12,000 households in 
Germany.
6 Our analysis draws on 9 waves of the SOEP, starting with 2000, when the sample 
was substantially enlarged, through the 2008 wave, the most recently available data at the 
time of this analysis. 
As in many empirical studies on entrepreneurial choice, we employ self-employment as a 
measurable proxy for the concept of entrepreneurship.
7 The classification of individuals as 
self-employed is based on a survey question about the occupational status of the respondents. 
If respondents are employed or self-employed in more than one position, they are asked to 
report their status in their primary activity. We restrict the sample to individuals between 18 
and 59 years of age and exclude farmers, civil servants, and those currently in education, 
vocational training, or military service. We also exclude family members working for a self-
employed relative from the data set because these individuals are not entrepreneurs in the 
sense of running their own business. In the present analysis, we are interested in both the 
transition into and out of self-employment.
8 Therefore, we identify in the data, when a person 
is observed in different employment states in two consecutive years, t and t+1. The 
observations of 2008 do not enter the estimations of entries and exits, but serve to identify 
transitions in 2007. In the estimation of the probability of being self-employed, the 2008 
observations can be fully included. 
                                                 
6 The SOEP began in 1984 as a longitudinal survey of private households and persons in West Germany and was 
expanded to include the former East German areas in June 1990. The central aim of this panel study is to collect 
representative micro-data about individuals, households, and families. It is similar to the BHPS (British 
Household Panel Survey) in the United Kingdom and the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) in the United 
States. A stable set of core questions appears every year, covering the most essential areas, such as population 
and demography; education, training, and qualification; labor market and occupational dynamics; earnings, 
income and social security; housing; health; household production; and basic orientation. For a more detailed 
data description, see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007). 
7 This broad definition of entrepreneurship is frequently used in economics and psychology; see inter alia 
Stewart and Roth (2001) or Rauch and Frese (2007). 
8 We thus employ only one success measure, namely survival in self-employment according to which individuals 
continue to remain self-employed. Moreover, we consider exits from entrepreneurship to be the sum of 
entrepreneurial failures and closures. For a discussion on business failure and closure, see Headd (2003).   6
Key to our analysis are measures of trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity 
that were included in specific waves of the SOEP survey. In the 2003 and 2008 survey waves 
the questionnaire included various measures of trust attitudes, which were elicited identically 
in both years. Respondents were asked i) to what extent “one can trust other people in 
general” (short reference: trustpeople), ii) whether “nowadays one cannot rely on anyone” 
(canttrust); and c) whether “it is better to be careful when dealing with strangers” 
(cautionstrangers). Respondents indicated their agreement with the statements on a 4-point 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). From these three main items on 
trust, we calculate an aggregate trust score as trust = [(5-trustpeople) + canttrust + 
cautionstrangers] / 3.
9 Thus, the trust scores range between 1 and 4, with a higher score 
indicating greater levels of trust.
10 
The data provide further items on trust. Respondents indicated on a 5-point scale from 1 
(very often) to 5 (never) how often they lent i) money, or ii) personal belongings to their 
friends; and iii) how often they leave the door of their home unlocked. Moreover, additional 
items were introduced as “yes or no” questions. In particular, respondents were asked if they 
believe i) that most people attempt to be fair, and ii) if people attempt to be helpful most of 
the time. The respondents also answered a question concerning whether or not they had ever 
benefited from the generosity of a stranger. Furthermore, the questionnaire asked the 
respondent to indicate how many close friends they think they have. 
In the 2005 survey wave, the SOEP included a special personality questionnaire 
containing measures of reciprocity. The respondents were asked how much they agreed with 
different statements about themselves, answering on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 
(“does not apply to me at all”) to 7 (“applies to me perfectly”). Three items each assessed the 
willingness for positive and negative reciprocity. The three statements assessing positive 
reciprocity were i) “If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it”; ii) “I go out of 
my way to help somebody who has been kind to me before”; and iii) “I am ready to undergo 
personal costs to help somebody who helped me before”. The statements for negative 
reciprocity were i) “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no 
matter what the cost”; ii) “If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to 
him/her”; and iii) “If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back”. We calculate scores 
for positive and negative reciprocity as the average scores from the three respective items.  
In the previous section, we show that decisions for trust and reciprocity also contain a 
risk component. For instance, trusting somebody always involves the risk that the trusting 
                                                 
9 Results from a factor analysis are available Table SA1 in the supplementary appendix and show i) that the trust 
items as well as the positive and negative reciprocity items load on three distinct factors, and ii) have an internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha) over 0.62 each. Hence, we use the constructed indices for the further analysis.    
10 Naef and Schupp (2009) emphasize that the dimension of this scale is distinct from trust in institutions and 
trust in known others. They show that the new scale of the SOEP is a valid and reliable measure of trust in 
strangers. The scale is valid in the sense that it correlates with trusting behaviour in the experiment.   7
person may be exploited. Therefore, we must take into account that these variables are 
correlated with risk attitudes.  If we do not control for risk attitude, any measured effect of 
trust on entrepreneurial outcomes could be spurious as it could really capture the effect of risk 
tolerance. To be able to analyze, ceteris paribus, effects of trust and reciprocity, we control 
for the self-reported willingness to take risks. The survey waves of 2004, 2006, and 2008 
include a question addressing the respondent’s general willingness to take risks on an 11-point 
scale ranging from 0 (“fully unwilling to take risks”) to 10 (“fully willing to take risks”), 
using identical wording all three waves. Table A1 in the Appendix summarizes the items on 
trust, reciprocity, and risk employed in this study and also provides the short names for each 
item that we use herein for reference. 
Since we observe the variables of social cognition only in specific survey waves, we 
impute a respondent’s scores in these variables into the observations of the same respondent 
in the other survey years. Personality traits are commonly regarded as being stable at least 
within a few years. If, in contrast, these variables change with time, it is possible that they 
may change in response to entrepreneurial developments, which would raise questions of 
reverse causality. For example, entrepreneurs might be more likely to report to trust because 
their interaction with people like suppliers, customers, lenders, and tax authorities forces them 
to trust to certain extent. Likewise, entrepreneurs might have more opportunities to lend 
money or personal belongings or to make friends.
11 
To avoid potential reverse causality, as much as possible, we impute historic values for 
risk attitudes and trust, which are elicited in more than one survey wave, where possible. For 
example, for 2004 through 2007, we use the trust variable from the year of 2003 and not from 
the year of 2008. In Section IV.3, we conduct several tests with respect to the stability of the 
variables of social cognition. In one specification, we limit the sample to the period 2005-
2008 and only use entries into and exits from self-employment observed after the 
measurement of trust, risk attitude, and reciprocity. 
In the econometric models, we include additional socio-demographic control variables 
(available in all waves) in order to derive, ceteris paribus, the effects of the social cognition 
variables. We control for education, age, work (in decades) and lifetime unemployment 
experience (in years) cumulated in life prior to the observation year, gender, marital status, 
number of children, German nationality, disability, whether the respondent’s father was self-
employed when the respondent was 15 years old, and real income from interests, dividends, 
and renting out (in €1000 in prices of 2005). Descriptions of these variables are presented in 
Table A4 in the Appendix. 
                                                 
11 Dohmen et al. (2008) study determinants of trust, positive, and negative reciprocity and find that women and 
older people tend to trust more and to be less negatively reciprocal, and more positively reciprocal (the effect of 
gender on positive reciprocity is not consistent across specifications, though). This highlights the importance of 
controlling for gender and age in our estimations.   8
III.2. Group Means and Correlations 
Table 1 shows the weighted means of the variables, based on the pooled sample of the 2000-
2008 waves. We divide the sample into three groups according to their employment state: 
Self-employed, employees and people not in paid work. Additionally we consider managers, 
which we define as the sub-group of employees with highly qualified duties or managerial 
functions (examples include department heads and managing directors). We conduct t-tests of 
equal means between the self-employed against those not self-employed (stars in column 1) 
and the three other sub-samples respectively (stars in columns 2-4). On average, the self-
employed have significantly higher trust scores than those not self-employed. We also 
observe that entrepreneurs report significantly more close friends and that a significantly 
higher share of entrepreneurs have profited from the generosity of a stranger at some point. 
Moreover, entrepreneurs more often lend belongings and money to their friends or leave their 
door unlocked (note that high scores indicate a low frequency, see Table A1). Entrepreneurs 
exhibit a significantly higher score in positive reciprocity, while there is no significant 
difference in the negative reciprocity score. Furthermore, the self-employed are more risk-
tolerant than the others (as shown in Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2009). When compared 
to managers, the self-employed are less willing to trust others while showing greater negative 
reciprocity toward others. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Correlation coefficients between the aggregate scores of trust and reciprocity and the risk 
attitude appear in Table 2. All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1%-level. Trust is 
positively correlated with positive reciprocity (but, with a very low correlation coefficient of 
0.01) as found by Dohmen et al. (2008) and Altmann et al. (2009); and negatively correlated 
with negative reciprocity (with a remarkably larger correlation coefficient, in absolute terms, 
of -0.12). Positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity are positively correlated. Here again, 
we emphasize that the correlation coefficient is relatively low at 0.057 (similar to the analysis 
of Dohmen et al., 2008). Last, but not least, there is a positive correlation between risk 
tolerance and each of the scores on trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity, but, 
again, correlation coefficients are low.
12 Table A2 in the Appendix shows the correlation 
coefficients between all single items on trust, reciprocity, and risk. The correlation 
coefficients generally confirm the internal consistency of the trust items as well as the internal 
consistency of positive and negative reciprocity. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
12 We also calculated correlation matrices for sub-samples by employment state (self-employed persons, 
employees, etc.). In contrast to the full sample, for the self-employed we observed a small, but now significant 
negative correlation between trust and positive reciprocity. This finding may indicate a self-selection of 
characters who exhibit an unusual combination of traits into entrepreneurship.    9
These observations allow three initial conclusions: (1) Entrepreneurs are – as we expect –  
more trustful than other people and have more often profited from strangers, but show, at the 
same time, a lower willingness to trust others than managers. (2) We are confident that, based 
on internal validity checks, there are no systematic inconsistencies in the answers to the 
questions behind the items presented in this paper. (3) The positive correlations between risk 
attitudes and all three variables of social cognition reveal that risk attitudes should be taken 
into account when analyzing trust and reciprocity. 
 
IV.  Empirical Results 
We model the probabilities of entry into, and exit from, self-employment as discrete time 
hazard rate models. The probability of entry into self-employment is estimated conditional on 
the tenure in dependent employment or the duration of non-employment, based on the sample 
of those in dependent employment and those not working. The probability of exit from self-
employment is estimated conditional on the duration of the current spell in self-employment, 
based on the sample of the self-employed. Applying discrete time hazard rate models allows 
consistently taking into account state dependence and avoids survivorship bias. Caliendo, 
Fossen, and Kritikos (2010) formally derive the estimation equation from a general notation 
of a survivor model. The final estimation equation is specified as a logit model of the yearly 
transition probability conditional on the duration of the current state, which can be estimated 
based on the data in person-year format (cf. Jenkins, 1995). 
The baseline hazard, which captures duration dependence, is specified flexibly as a third 
degree polynomial of the duration in the current state. For example, in the model of exit from 
self-employment, we expect the probability of exit to be high in the first years of self-
employment and to decline with longer duration, once the initial hurdles are passed. The 
model of entry into self-employment allows the baseline hazards to differ between those in 
dependent employment and those not working. This is achieved by an interaction of the 
variables capturing the spell duration with a dummy variable indicating the current state. In 
addition to estimating the entry and exit rates, we also directly estimate the probability of 
being self-employed. Specifically, we estimate a logit model of the probability of being self-
employed, based on the full sample of the self-employed, those in dependent employment and 
those not working. 
 
IV.1. Main Specifications 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the main estimations. We use a twofold strategy where 
we examine the impact of the aggregated trust and reciprocity items in Table 3, before 
focusing on single items in Table 4. Both tables contain the estimated marginal effects on the   10
probability of being self-employed and on the yearly transition probabilities into and out of 
self-employment, evaluated at the mean values of the other explanatory variables. For each of 
these outcome variables we include a large set of controls that are proven to be important, 
including e.g. risk attitudes and parental self-employment. We standardize all variables 
referring to trust and reciprocity, except for the dummy variables. Therefore, the marginal 
effects of these variables displayed in the tables indicate the change in the probability induced 
if their value increases by one standard deviation. The means of the outcome variables, i.e. the 
average probabilities, are shown at the bottom of the tables. 
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE 
Before we examine the impact of trust and reciprocity, we note that the estimated effects 
of the socio-economic control variables on entrepreneurial development are consistent with 
prior research: Male persons, individuals with a self-employed father (when the respondent 
was 15 years old), and higher educated individuals are not only more likely to start-up an own 
business, they are also more likely to remain self-employed. Moreover, we can confirm an 
interesting wealth effect: yearly real capital income (in 1000€), which we use as an indicator 
for wealth, has a positive impact on the probability of business creation (see, e.g., 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). However, wealth has no significant influence on the 
probability to remain self-employed. Also consistent with previous research are the findings 
with respect to the crucial variable of risk attitudes. Less risk averse persons have a higher 
probability to start a business and there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between risk 
attitudes and the survival rates of entrepreneurs (Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos 2009, 2010). 
It is important to emphasize that the influences of these variables on entrepreneurial 
development can still be observed when we control for variables of trust and positive and 
negative reciprocity, which all have positive correlations with risk attitudes. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that the aggregated trust and reciprocity indices have only 
a limited influence on the probability of being self-employed and on the transition 
probabilities. While people who trust more do have a significantly higher probability to enter 
self-employment, we do not find significant effects of the trust variable on the probability to 
be in or to exit self-employment. The marginal effect on the entry decision is reasonable, as 
an increase in the trust variable by one standard deviation increases the entry probability by 
0.08 percentage points, which translates into a relative effect of about 7% given the yearly 
entry probability into self-employment of 1.2%  (as indicated at the bottom of Table 3). The 
effect is large enough to be economically considerable even if it is smaller than the effect of 
the strongest, well-known determinants of self-employment. For example, having a university 
degree or having had a self-employed father when the respondent was 15 years old, have 
marginal effects of 0.28 and 0.27 percentage points, or 24% and 23% in relative terms. 
For positive and negative reciprocity, where we expect only an influence of these 
variables on exit from self-employment, we cannot establish a significant relationship. The   11
limited support for the above derived hypotheses might be due to the fact that the cumulated 
indices are too broadly defined to measure the influence of these personality traits on 
entrepreneurial development. To be more specific: we are particularly hypothesizing that 
there are limits to the positive relationships between trust and entrepreneurial survival and 
between positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity and entrepreneurial survival. Therefore, 
we cannot exclude that the effects of weaker and stronger single items among these variables 
may cancel each other out.  
Accordingly, we estimate the influence of these single items, presented in Table 4. We 
first focus on the effects of the personality dimensions on the probability to be self-employed. 
Here it is obvious that people who are more trustful are more likely to be entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs are less careful when dealing with strangers (cautionstrangers, note that high 
scores indicate disagreement with the statement, see Table A1), are particularly willing to 
lend money to their friends, and to leave their front door unlocked (again note the scale). An 
interesting point is that they also profited more often from strangers (dprofitfromstranger). On 
the other hand, we observe that entrepreneurs expect to be exploited if given the opportunity 
(dfair). Thus, entrepreneurs are aware that they cannot blindly trust others to be fair. Table 4 
also presents the marginal effects of these variables, which can be straightforwardly 
interpreted: The largest effect is observable among people who have profited from the 
generosity of a person (dprofitfromstranger). It increases the probability to be self-employed 
by 1.38 percentage points. Considering that the self-employment rate in the sample is 8.52%, 
this corresponds to a relative effect of 16.2%. On the other hand, people who think that others 
would exploit them if given the opportunity (dfair) have a higher probability to be in self-
employment by 1.0 percentage points, corresponding to a relative effect of 11.7%. Also 
further trust variables have an effect: People who lend money to their friends have a higher 
probability to be self-employed with a one standard deviation increase in the subjective 
frequency of lending money leading to a 0.61 percentage higher probability, or a relative 
effect of 7.2%. A higher probability of self-employment is also observed for people leaving 
their door unlocked more often. Again for comparison, a university degree increases the 
probability of being self-employed by 1.35 percentage points and a self-employed father by 
4.49 percentage points, which correspond to relative effects of 15.8% and 52.7%. 
An interesting point is that almost none of these variables have a significant impact on 
entry or exit decisions. Entry decisions are positively influenced if the entrepreneurs profited 
from people they never met before. Thus, it is the “passive” trust variable that drives this 
result: a measure of how much other people trusted the entrepreneur. The effect is again 
substantial, as this dummy variable increases the entry probability by 0.17 percentage points 
or 14.6%. With respect to the end of the entrepreneurial activities, there is one variable 
influencing the exit decision: the number of close friends negatively affecting the exit rate. 
That is, people with more friends have a lower probability to exit self-employment. A one 
standard deviation increase in the number of friends decreases the exit probability by a   12
substantial 9%, given that the exit rate is about 10%. A self-employed father decreases the 
exit probability by 18.5%. 
Therefore, in accordance with hypothesis H1, we find that persons more trustful to other 
people from an active point of view, and those who received more benefits in return to or as a 
consequence of their trustful activities, have a higher probability of being entrepreneurs. With 
respect to entry into self-employment we also observe the expected positive influences of trust 
on the decision to become an entrepreneur, although the effect is weaker than one could 
expect from the effects on the stock of entrepreneurs. Moreover, the significant difference in 
the variable “dfair”, according to which people will be exploitive if given the opportunity, 
indicates that entrepreneurs are aware that they should not be blindly trustful toward others.  
Going further to the single items related to positive and negative reciprocity, we detect 
weaker influences for these variables. The three positive reciprocity items neither influence 
the entry decision, as expected, nor the exit decision. Consistently, positive reciprocity does 
not significantly influence the probability of being an entrepreneur. 
This leaves us with negative reciprocity. While the aggregated variable shows no 
influence on entrepreneurship, the single variables do, as shown in Table 4. First, we must 
emphasize that the three negative reciprocity variables have a ranking in intensity, with 
“returndisadvantage” being the weakest form of negative reciprocity followed by 
“offendback”. The variable revenge, “If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon 
as possible, no matter what it costs,” is the strongest form of negative reciprocity. With 
respect to these variables we find that entrepreneurs are less willing to return offense. More 
specifically, one standard deviation more willingness to offend others in return to their 
offense decreases the probability of being self-employed by 0.5 percentage points, a relative 
effect of 5.9%. Moreover, revenge has a negative influence on entrepreneurial survival: 
entrepreneurs who want to take revenge no matter what, have a greater exit probability to the 
magnitude of about 9%. Thus, we find a first indicator that strong negative reciprocity has a 
negative impact on entrepreneurial survival.  
 
IV.2. Comparison with Managers 
To shed more light on the influence of trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity on 
entrepreneurial decision making, we additionally estimate – as noted in section 2 – two 
supplementary models where we make comparisons between specific subgroups of employed 
and self-employed individuals. In Table 5 we focus on a comparison between self-employed 
individuals and managers; again the table shows marginal effects. The self-employed may be 
viewed as more comparable to the narrowly defined control group of managers than to other 
occupational groups. Contrasting entrepreneurs with managers is the common approach in the 
psychological literature (see, for example, Zhao and Seibert, 2006). In column 1, we include   13
the aggregated trust and reciprocity items as explanatory variables, while in column 2 we 
examine the influence of the single items. As the sample includes only the self-employed 
(coded as 1) and managers (coded as 0), the estimations are based on substantially fewer 
observations than in the preceding analysis. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The results indicate that higher trust decreases the likelihood of being self-employed as 
opposed to a manager. This differs from the effect of trust on the probability of entry into self-
employment (in comparison to wage work and non-employment), where we find the opposite. 
The marginal effect of an increase in trust by one standard deviation on the probability of 
being self-employed versus a manager is -2.1 percentage points corresponding to a relative 
effect of -5.8% (the share of the self-employed in this pooled sample of self-employed 
persons and managers is 36.1%). Thus, a greater willingness to trust others decreases the 
probability of being self-employed when compared with managers, but increases the 
likelihood of entry into self-employment versus the complete population. 
We repeat this estimation, but instead of contrasting all self-employed against the 
managers, we only include the sub-group of the self-employed who have at least one 
employee in the estimation sample.
13 The results are very similar. All variables significant in 
Table 5 keep their signs and (except for canttrust) remain significant, and no additional 
variables of those shown in Table 5 become significant. The effect of the aggregated trust 
measure becomes even stronger: A one standard deviation increase in the amount of trust 
leads to a 3 percentage points lower probability of being self-employed with employees 
instead of being a manager, corresponding to a relative effect of -13.7%.
14 
 
IV.3. Further Robustness Checks 
So far we assume that trust and reciprocity traits are constant over time, at least over the 
observation period of nine years. If these characteristics change non-randomly within shorter 
time intervals, and the changes are correlated with self-employment status or transitions, 
issues of reverse causality may arise. A unique feature of our data is that the same respondents 
are asked the same questions assessing trust both in 2003 and 2008. This allows us to directly 
                                                 
13 Full results are available in Table SA2 in the supplementary appendix. 
14 Finally we estimate a probability model of having employees, conditional on being self-employed. Estimating 
this conditional probability is based on the sub-sample of the self-employed. As self-selection into self-
employment is non-random, we estimate a probability model with selection (cp. Heckman, 1979), specifically, 
the probit sample selection model for binary dependent variables suggested by van de Ven and van Praag (1981). 
The results, which are available in Table SA3 in the supplementary appendix, show that the aggregated measure 
of trust has a significant and negative effect on the probability of having employees, conditional on being self-
employed. This is similar to the results from the comparison of self-employed with managers. The single item 
analysis reveals that the negative effect of the trust score is driven by disagreement with the statement “on the 
whole one can trust people”, which increases the probability of having employees.   14
test if transitions into or out of self-employment between the repeated interviews induced 
changes in trust (see Caliendo et al., 2010, for similar tests which showed the stability of risk 
attitudes). Unfortunately, the data do not yet permit such an analysis for positive and negative 
reciprocity, as these characteristics have, so far, only been elicited in the 2005 wave. For trust, 
we estimate OLS regressions of the change in the aggregate trust score between the two times 
of measurement 2003 and 2008 on a dummy variable indicating entry into or exit out of self-
employment at any time within this time span, with and without the control variables used 
before. The results in Table A3 in the Appendix indicate that the coefficients of both entry 
and exit are insignificant, which shows that entry and exit do not affect the observed change 
in trust. Considering the positive effect of trust on entry (Table 3), we conclude that trust is a 
determinant of entry into self-employment and not vice versa. 
To further assess if reverse causality influences the results, we re-estimate the models of 
the probabilities of self-employment, entry, and exit, based on the limited sample spanning 
2005-2008 only. We exclusively use the measure of trust in 2003 and of risk in 2004. As 
positive and negative reciprocity are elicited in 2005, and as the entry and exit indicators are 
coded as 1 in t if a transition occurs between the interviews in t and t+1, all personality 
variables are measured before the outcomes in the transition models. The estimated 
coefficients of the personality characteristics (available in Table SA4 in the supplementary 
appendix) are similar to the results in Table 3. The effect of trust is positive in the entry model 
at the 1% level again; the point estimate of the marginal effect is 0.0011 and thus somewhat 
larger than in Table 3, but the 95% confidence intervals clearly overlap (the robust standard 
error is 0.0004). In the models of self-employment exit and state, trust remains insignificant. 
Positive and negative reciprocity remain insignificant in all models, except for positive 
reciprocity in the exit model: It is significantly negative at the 10% level now with a point 
estimate of -0.0072 and a robust standard error of 0.0039. 
As another robustness check, we assess if the results change if the various single 
measures of trust, positive, and negative reciprocity are not included in one, but in separate 
regressions. For each of the models of self-employment state, entry, and exit, we estimate 10 
additional specifications with different subsets of the single items listed in Table 4.
15 The 
results turn out to be very robust: All the significant variables in Table 4 stay significant and 
keep the same sign any time they are included, and all the insignificant variables stay 
insignificant. There is only one exception: In the entry model, the item returnhelp (which is 
used to construct positive reciprocity), which is insignificant in Table 4, keeps its negative 
sign, but becomes significant at the 10% level if no trust items are included. This may be 
explained by multicollinearity with some of the trust variables. 
                                                 
15 These subsets of items are chosen (cf. Table A1): 1) positive reciprocity items, 2) negative reciprocity items, 
3) both, 4) main trust items, 5) trust dummy variables, 6) trust measures of the type “How often does it occur…”, 
7) number of friends, 8) 5 and 7 combined, 9) 6 and 7 combined, 10), 5, 6, and 7 combined. Full results appear in 
Tables SA5-SA7 in the supplementary appendix.   15
V.  Conclusions 
In this explorative study we investigate, for the first time, the predictive power of three 
variables of social cognition on entrepreneurial development. The three variables trust, 
positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity are highly prominent in experimental economics. 
As entrepreneurs are confronted on a daily basis with the exchange process and interactions 
with others, they might particularly depend on these characteristics. Therefore, we aim to 
determine whether entrepreneurs are different from other people in the economy with respect 
to trust and reciprocity and whether the variables influence the decision making processes of 
entrepreneurs in terms of entry and survival in self-employment. We use the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), an experimentally validated survey, which contained, in the 2003, 
2005 and 2008 waves, questions addressing the three needed variables. 
In our analysis, we find, to some extent, support for our two hypotheses and at the same 
time some surprising results. A higher level of trust, aggregately measured, significantly 
increases the probability of entry into self-employment. In the further analysis of various trust 
items, we also find that being aware of the negative consequences of unconditional trust 
increases the probability of being self-employed.  
What is surprising, though, is the reversed effect of the aggregated trust variable when 
comparing entrepreneurs to employed managers. A higher general willingness to trust 
increases the probability of being an entrepreneur and, even more, an entrepreneur with 
employees, as opposed to a manager. There are two possible explanations for these outcomes. 
On the one hand managers might need to rely on others more than entrepreneurs. In particular 
when managers have general tasks, they might need to be trustful to others. Entrepreneurs 
rarely run businesses so large that they are unable to have an overview and basic knowledge 
of each part of their business. Therefore, entrepreneurs might have less need for unconditional 
trust. On the other hand, managers only have limited liabilities for their decisions. They may 
have a greater willingness to unconditionally rely on their staff’s decisions. As their personal 
payoffs might not be affected, they face lower personal risk if exploited. The liabilities of 
entrepreneurs tend to be almost unlimited. Being exploited will affect their payoffs more 
directly when compared to managers. Thus, entrepreneurs might tend to avoid too much trust. 
The awareness of exploitation seems to be one major factor separating entrepreneurs from 
managers clearly indicating a contrasting result to La Porta et al. (1997). 
Positive reciprocity neither influences entry nor exit decisions into and from self-
employment in the preferred specifications, nor does it increase the probability of being self-
employed. An interesting result is the fact that a high willingness for revenge – the strongest 
form of negative reciprocity – increases the probability of exiting entrepreneurship. Therefore, 
with respect to entrepreneurs we do not find support for previous expectations that negatively 
reciprocal people might have a “strategic advantage in bargaining, at the workplace and social   16
interactions in general” as they “can threaten to retaliate … unfair or uncooperative 
treatments” (as suggested by Dohmen et al., 2008, p. 90). 
Our analysis finds that the influence of the variables of social cognition is below the 
expectations raised by experimental economics. The most interesting results are revealed with 
respect to trust variables. With respect to positive reciprocity and to negative reciprocity, we 
must ask to what extent these variables are crucial for entrepreneurial development. An 
avenue toward a final answer determining the relevance of these three variables of social 
cognition could be employing more general concepts to personality traits such as the Big Five 
approach where the social cognition variables could be additionally taken into account and 
where all partial effects on economic outcomes could then be examined jointly.   17
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Employment State (Weighted Means) 
 Self-Employed  Employees  Not  working  Managers 
trust
  2.375 ***  2.304 ***  2.198 ***  2.481 *** 
positive reciprocity
  5.945 ***  5.895 **  5.862 ***  5.906 ** 
negative reciprocity
  3.178 3.185 3.205 3.000  *** 
returnfavor  6.458 **  6.510 **  6.503 **  6.429 
returnhelp  5.930 5.921 5.948 5.808  *** 
returncostlyhelp  5.438 ***  5.258 ***  5.160 ***  5.472 
revenge  3.340 3.300 3.252  **  3.174  *** 
returndisadvantage  2.990 2.942 2.941 2.839  *** 
offendback  3.187 ***  3.305 ***  3.387 ***  3.005 *** 
trustpeople  2.392 **  2.398  2.500 ***  2.261 *** 
canttrust  2.630 ***  2.606  2.464 ***  2.787 *** 
cautionstrangers  1.889 ***  1.707 ***  1.619 ***  1.928 ** 
dfair  0.481  0.504 **  0.429 ***  0.585 *** 
dhelpful  0.307 0.308 0.292 0.332  ** 
dprofitfromstranger  0.264 ***  0.192 ***  0.176 ***  0.305 *** 
numberfriends  4.473 **  4.418  4.034 ***  4.632 ** 
lendbelongings  3.143 ***  3.200 **  3.327 ***  3.055 *** 
lendmoney  4.114 ***  4.244 ***  4.315 ***  4.175 ** 
doorunlocked  3.871 ***  4.113 ***  4.166 ***  4.043 *** 
will_risk  5.618 ***  4.707 ***  4.315 ***  5.177 *** 
female  0.320 ***  0.477 ***  0.731 ***  0.301 * 
highschool  0.429 ***  0.246 ***  0.158 ***  0.651 *** 
apprenticeship  0.412 ***  0.533 ***  0.485 ***  0.310 *** 
highertechncol  0.291 ***  0.252 ***  0.224 ***  0.238 *** 
university  0.340 ***  0.176 ***  0.104 ***  0.642 *** 
age  43.353 ***  40.732 ***  40.516 ***  41.875 *** 
prworkexp10  1.717 ***  1.582 ***  1.130 ***  1.545 *** 
prunempexp  0.556 ***  0.535  1.721 ***  0.243 *** 
disabled  0.028 ***  0.063 ***  0.074 ***  0.045 *** 
german  0.941 **  0.938  0.885 ***  0.963 *** 
fatherse  0.133 ***  0.072 ***  0.069 ***  0.110 ** 
nchild  0.650  0.599 **  0.945 ***  0.635 
married  0.593 0.579 0.641  ***  0.560  ** 
divorced  0.118 **  0.098 ***  0.119  0.082 *** 
capincr1000  4.546 ***  1.081 ***  0.926 ***  1.820 *** 
Entry into self-empl.    0.007  0.017  0.013 
Exit from self-empl.  0.093       
Person-years
1  6326  54173 13607 11185 
Notes: The weighted means of the variables of social cognition are calculated before standardization. We 
conducted t-tests of mean equality in the variables. Stars (***/**/*) in the first column indicate that the 
mean for the self-employed is statistically different from the mean for those not self-employed (i.e. 
employees and those not working) at the 0.1%/5%/10% level. The stars in columns 2 and 3 refer to tests 
between the self-employed and employees and between the self-employed and those not working, and in 
column 4 between the self-employed and managers. See Tables A1 and A4 for a detailed description of the 
variables. 
1 For trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity, N is 6435 for the self-employed, 55107 for 
employees, 13860 for those not working, and 11385 for managers. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
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Table 2: Correlation Table for Aggregated Trust and Reciprocity Variables 
  trust  positive reciprocity  negative reciprocity  will_risk 
trust    1.0000     
positive reciprocity   0.0094*   1.0000     
negative reciprocity  -0.1203*   0.0567*   1.0000   
will_risk   0.0723*   0.0572*   0.0659*   1.0000 
Person-years 75692 
Notes: Only correlation coefficients significant at the 10% level or better are listed, those significant at the 1% 
level are marked with a star. Correlation coefficients with larger significance levels are left blank in the matrix. 
See Table A1 for variable descriptions. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
 
Table 3: Main Regression Results (Aggregated Index) – Marginal Effects 
 Stock  Entry  Exit 
trust   0.0011   0.0008***   0.0010 
 (0.0020)  (0.0003)  (0.0035) 
positive reciprocity   0.0009   0.0000   0.0017 
 (0.0021)  (0.0003)  (0.0034) 
negative reciprocity  -0.0023   0.0001   0.0026 
 (0.0020)  (0.0003)  (0.0037) 
will_risk   0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0141** 
 (0.0029)  (0.0004)  (0.0058) 
will_risk_sq   0.0010***   0.0002***   0.0014*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0000)  (0.0005) 
female -0.0358***  -0.0037***  0.0323*** 
 (0.0046)  (0.0006)  (0.0086) 
highschool 0.0347*** 0.0031*** -0.0219** 
 (0.0066)  (0.0009)  (0.0098) 
apprenticeship -0.0177***  -0.0011  0.0017 
 (0.0052)  (0.0007)  (0.0110) 
highertechncol 0.0083  0.0000  -0.0021 
 (0.0057)  (0.0007)  (0.0107) 
university 0.0142**  0.0028***  -0.0089 
 (0.0063)  (0.0010)  (0.0104) 
age 0.0121***  0.0014***  -0.0064* 
 (0.0017)  (0.0002)  (0.0036) 
agesq -0.0001***  -0.0000***  0.0001** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
prworkexp10 0.0046  0.0004  -0.0205** 
 (0.0038)  (0.0006)  (0.0084) 
prunempexp -0.0062***  -0.0006***  0.0048** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0002)  (0.0023) 
disabled -0.0332***  -0.0010  0.0140 
 (0.0052)  (0.0011)  (0.0211) 
german 0.0006  0.0007  -0.0068 
 (0.0086)  (0.0010)  (0.0150) 
fatherse 0.0473***  0.0027**  -0.0165* 
 (0.0096)  (0.0012)  (0.0094) 
nchild 0.0021  0.0000  0.0037 
 (0.0020)  (0.0003)  (0.0044) 
married -0.0097*  -0.0004 0.0024 
 (0.0054)  (0.0007)  (0.0107) 
divorced 0.0083  -0.0006  0.0017 
 (0.0078)  (0.0010)  (0.0151) 
capincr1000 0.0006***  0.0000***  -0.0002 
 (0.0002)  (0.0000)  (0.0002) 
duration   -0.0030***  -0.0260*** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0050) 
dur_sq   0.0002***  0.0014*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0005) 
continued on the following page  21
Continued 
dur_cu   -0.0000***  -0.0000* 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
notempl   0.0020   
  (0.0016)   
duration_ne   0.0017*   
  (0.0009)   
dur_sq_ne   -0.0002   
  (0.0001)   
dur_cu_ne   0.0000   
  (0.0000)   
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes 
Wald 2   914.657   784.294   296.169 
Log likelihood  -19711.023  -3519.194  -1703.583 
Mean outcome   0.085187   0.011666   0.099844 
Person-years   75692   62491   5759 
Notes: Marginal effects after logit estimation, evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. For dummy 
variables, the effects of a discrete change from 0 to 1 are shown. Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. See Tables A1 and A4 for 
a detailed description of the variables. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
 
Table 4: Main Regression Results (Single Personality Items) – Marginal Effects 
 Stock  Entry  Exit 
returnfavor  -0.0002   0.0003   0.0035 
  (0.0023) (0.0003) (0.0039) 
returnhelp  -0.0015 -0.0005   0.0005 
  (0.0024) (0.0003) (0.0043) 
returncostlyhelp   0.0020   0.0002  -0.0015 
  (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0041) 
revenge   0.0024   0.0003   0.0090* 
  (0.0030) (0.0004) (0.0049) 
returndisadvantage  -0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0042 
  (0.0030) (0.0004) (0.0055) 
offendback -0.0050** -0.0000  -0.0014 
  (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0049) 
trustpeople   0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0005 
  (0.0023) (0.0003) (0.0042) 
canttrust  -0.0025   0.0003   0.0046 
  (0.0023) (0.0003) (0.0044) 
cautionstrangers   0.0052***   0.0005  -0.0058 
  (0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0038) 
dfair -0.0100**  -0.0009    0.0037 
  (0.0043) (0.0006) (0.0087) 
dhelpful   0.0005   0.0003   0.0091 
  (0.0044) (0.0006) (0.0089) 
dprofitfromstranger   0.0138***   0.0017**   0.0100 
  (0.0051) (0.0007) (0.0088) 
numberfriends   0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0090** 
  (0.0019) (0.0002) (0.0041) 
lendbelongings   0.0035  -0.0004   0.0027 
  (0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0043) 
lendmoney -0.0061***  -0.0003  -0.0023 
  (0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0039) 
doorunlocked -0.0074***  -0.0002    0.0050 
  (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0035) 
will_risk   0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0153*** 
  (0.0029) (0.0004) (0.0059) 
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will_risk_sq   0.0009***   0.0002***   0.0016*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0005) 
female  -0.0349*** -0.0037*** 0.0312*** 
  (0.0046) (0.0006) (0.0087) 
highschool  0.0333*** 0.0030*** -0.0238** 
  (0.0065) (0.0009) (0.0100) 
apprenticeship -0.0166***  -0.0010  0.0037 
  (0.0052) (0.0007) (0.0113) 
highertechncol  0.0077 0.0000 -0.0008 
  (0.0056) (0.0007) (0.0109) 
university  0.0135** 0.0025** -0.0064 
  (0.0062) (0.0010) (0.0106) 
age  0.0114*** 0.0014*** -0.0057 
  (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0035) 
agesq  -0.0001*** -0.0000*** 0.0001* 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
prworkexp10  0.0053 0.0006 -0.0198** 
  (0.0038) (0.0006) (0.0087) 
prunempexp -0.0062*** -0.0006*** 0.0037 
  (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0024) 
disabled -0.0325***  -0.0010  0.0152 
  (0.0050) (0.0011) (0.0215) 
german  0.0002 0.0006 -0.0027 
  (0.0087) (0.0010) (0.0148) 
fatherse 0.0449***  0.0028**  -0.0185** 
  (0.0095) (0.0012) (0.0093) 
nchild 0.0017  -0.0000  0.0027 
  (0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0045) 
married  -0.0080 -0.0003 0.0018 
  (0.0053) (0.0007) (0.0107) 
divorced 0.0062 -0.0008 0.0024 
  (0.0076) (0.0009) (0.0155) 
capincr1000 0.0005*** 0.0000**  -0.0002 
  (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
duration   -0.0029***  -0.0254*** 
   (0.0003)  (0.0052) 
dur_sq   0.0002***  0.0014*** 
   (0.0000)  (0.0005) 
dur_cu   -0.0000***  -0.0000* 
   (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
notempl   0.0014  
   (0.0015)   
duration_ne   0.0021**   
   (0.0008)   
dur_sq_ne   -0.0002*  
   (0.0001)   
dur_cu_ne   0.0000   
   (0.0000)   
Year  dummies  yes yes yes 
Wald 2   955.221   797.366  314.425 
Log likelihood  -19216.098  -3436.869  -1666.336 
Mean outcome   0.085214   0.011635   0.100071 
Person-years   74389   61365   5656 
Notes: Marginal effects after logit estimation, evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. For dummy 
variables, the effects of a discrete change from 0 to 1 are shown. Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. See Tables A1 and A4 for 
a detailed description of the variables. 
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Table 5: Self-Employment versus Being a Manager – Marginal Effects on the Stock 
  Aggregated Trust and 
Reciprocity Variables 
Personality Items with 
Additional Trust Items 
trust -0.0209**   
 (0.0091)   
positive reciprocity   0.0006   
 (0.0098)   
negative reciprocity   0.0066   
 (0.0095)   
returnfavor     0.0103 
  (0.0105) 
returnhelp     0.0081 
  (0.0114) 
returncostlyhelp   -0.0167 
  (0.0114) 
revenge   -0.0008 
  (0.0133) 
returndisadvantage   -0.0001 
  (0.0140) 
offendback   0.0087 
  (0.0114) 
trustpeople     0.0054 
  (0.0114) 
canttrust   -0.0183* 
  (0.0110) 
cautionstrangers     0.0036 
  (0.0101) 
dfair   -0.0479** 
  (0.0219) 
dhelpful     0.0341 
  (0.0216) 
dprofitfromstranger     0.0047 
  (0.0212) 
numberfriends     0.0037 
  (0.0092) 
lendbelongings     0.0221** 
  (0.0102) 
lendmoney   -0.0357*** 
  (0.0103) 
doorunlocked   -0.0223** 
  (0.0093) 
will_risk -0.0182  -0.0185 
 (0.0154)  (0.0158) 
will_risk_sq   0.0040***   0.0039*** 
 (0.0014)  (0.0015) 
Control variables  yes  yes 
Wald 2  422.608 433.852 
Log likelihood  -10262.049  -10018.735 
Mean outcome  0.361091  0.361238 
Person-years   17857   17548 
Notes: Marginal effects after logit estimation, evaluated at the means of the 
explanatory variables. For dummy variables, the effects of a discrete change from 
0 to 1 are shown. Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. 
Results for the control variables appear in Table SA2 in the supplementary 
appendix. See Table A1 for a detailed description of the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
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Appendix  
Table A1: Questionnaire Wording 
Personality trait  Questionnaire wording  Item's short name 
    
Reciprocity  Scale: 1 ('does not apply to me at all') to 7 ('applies to me perfectly')   
Positive reciprocity  If someone does me a favor, I am prepared to return it    returnfavor 
Positive reciprocity  I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me 
before 
returnhelp 
Positive reciprocity  I am ready to undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped 
me before 
returncostlyhelp 
    
Negative reciprocity  If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as soon as possible, no 
matter what the cost 
revenge 
Negative reciprocity  If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to 
him/her 
returndisadvantage 
Negative reciprocity  If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back  offendback 
    
Trust (main items)  Scale: 1 ('totally agree') to 4 ('totally disagree')   
Trust (reversed)  On the whole one can trust people  trustpeople 
Trust  Nowadays one can't rely on anyone  canttrust 
Trust  If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one 
can trust them 
cautionstrangers 
    
Trust (supplementary) Scale: 0 ('no') or 1 ('yes')   
  Do you believe that most people would exploit you if they had the 
opportunity (dfair=0), or would attempt to be fair toward you 
(dfair=1)? 
dfair 
  Would you say that for most of the time, people attempt to be helpful 
(dhelpful=1)? Or only act in their own interests (dhelpful=0)? 
dhelpful 
  Have you ever profited from the generosity of a person, who you had 
not previously met (dprofitfromstrainger=1; otherwise =0)? 
dprofitfromstranger
    
  Scale: Metric  
  What would you say: How many close friends do you have?  numberfriends 
    
  Scale: 1 ('very often) to 5 ('never')  
  How often does it occur that, ...   
  …that you lend your friends your personal belongings (i.e. CDs, 
books, car, bicycle)? 
lendbelongings 
  …that you lend your friends money?  lendmoney 
  …that you leave the door to your apartment unlocked?  doorunlocked 
    
Risk attitude  Scale: 0 ('fully unwilling to take risks') to 10 ('fully willing to take 
risks') 
 
  Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do 
you try to avoid taking risks? 
will_risk 
    
Constructed indices  trust = [(5-trustpeople) + canttrust + cautionstrangers] / 3 
  positive reciprocity = (returnfavor + returnhelp + returncostlyhelp) / 3 
  negative reciprocity = (revenge + returndisadvantage + offendback) / 3 
Notes: The items on reciprocity were included in the survey wave 2005 of the SOEP, those on trust in 2003 and 
2008, and those on the willingness to take risks in 2004, 2006, and 2008. 
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Table A2: Correlation Table for Single Personality Items 
 trustpeople  canttrust  caution-
strangers  dfair dhelpful  dprofitfrom-
stranger 
trustpeople   1.0000           
canttrust -0.4956*    1.0000        
cautionstrangers  -0.2672*     0.3083*   1.0000       
dfair  -0.4219*     0.3792*   0.2583*  1.0000     
dhelpful  -0.3442*        0.2883*   0.1995*   0.4136*  1.0000   
dprofitfromstranger  -0.0939*           0.1180*   0.1252*   0.0953*   0.0628*   1.0000 
numberfriends  -0.1276*            0.1180*   0.0910*   0.1199*   0.1137*   0.0524* 
lendbelongings   0.0815*   -0.1362*  -0.0786* -0.0809*  -0.0343*  -0.1775* 
lendmoney   0.0401*   -0.0712*  -0.0952*  -0.0244*  -0.0181*  -0.1646* 
doorunlocked   0.0686*   -0.0694*  -0.1048* -0.0498*  -0.0113*  -0.1475* 
returnfavor  -0.0120*   0.0271*  -0.0534*   0.0071     0.0266* 
returnhelp   0.0223*  -0.0156*  -0.0844*  -0.0359*  -0.0064   
returncostlyhelp  -0.0607*            0.0521*   0.0364*   0.0212*   0.0397*   0.0751* 
revenge   0.1208*       -0.0988*  -0.0548*  -0.0971*  -0.0715*  -0.0307* 
returndisadvantage   0.0865*        -0.0861* -0.0359*  -0.0819*  -0.0446* -0.0394* 
offendback   0.0976*      -0.0916*  -0.0415*  -0.0797*  -0.0563*  -0.0204* 









unlocked  returnfavor returnhelp 
numberfriends   1.0000           
lendbelongings -0.1549*   1.0000         
lendmoney -0.0716*    0.4585*  1.0000       
doorunlocked  -0.0377*   0.2120*     0.1752*  1.0000     
returnfavor   0.0185*  -0.0813*   -0.0225*  -0.0106*   1.0000   
returnhelp   0.0133*  -0.0390*      -0.0202*   0.0075   0.4104*   1.0000 
returncostlyhelp   0.0517*  -0.0955*       -0.1146*  -0.0423*   0.2571*   0.4414* 
revenge  -0.0417*   0.0277*              0.0109*  -0.0110*   0.0745* 
returndisadvantage  -0.0392*   0.0541*              0.0161*  -0.0648*   0.0597* 
offendback  -0.0249*   0.0538*              0.0138*  -0.0414*   0.0500* 
will_risk   0.0816*  -0.1268*          -0.1384*  -0.0824*   0.0072   0.0153* 
 
returncostly-
help  revenge  returndis-
advantage  offendback will_risk   
returncostlyhelp   1.0000           
revenge   0.0684*  1.0000        
returndisadvantage   0.0656*   0.7180*  1.0000       
offendback   0.0629*   0.5478*   0.5801*   1.0000     
will_risk   0.0857*   0.0776*   0.0552*     0.0395*   1.0000   
Person-years 74389 
Notes: Only correlation coefficients significant at the 10% level or better are listed, those significant at the 1% 
level are marked with a star. Correlation coefficients with larger significance levels are left blank in the matrix.
It is interesting to note that the variable trustpeople is technically speaking negatively correlated (or in substance 
positively correlated) with having profited from a stranger (dprofitfromstranger). Thus, the active willingness to 
trust others is in positive correlation to the passive trust variable of having received generosity from others. 
Moreover, the number of close friends is positively correlated with each of the three positive reciprocity items 
and negatively with the three negative reciprocity items. See Table A1 for a detailed description of the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
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Table A3: Is Trust Affected by Transitions into or out of Entrepreneurship? 
Dependent variable.: Change in the aggregated trust score between 2003 and 2008 
Sample:  Persons not self-employed in 2003  Persons self-employed in 2003 
Entry between 2003 and 2008  0.0305  0.0254     
 (0.0303)  (0.0305)     
Exit between 2003 and 2008      -0.0147  -0.0058 
     (0.0528)  (0.0549) 
Control  variables  no yes  no yes 
R
2  0.000 0.002 0.000 0.028 
Mean change in trust score  0.006  0.006  0.011  0.011 
N 5731  5731  485  485 
Notes: The table shows coefficients from OLS regressions of the change in the aggregated trust score (not 
standardized) on dummy variables indicating entry into or exit from self-employment between 2003 and 2008. 
Standard errors in parentheses. The results for the control variables are available from the authors on request. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2003-08. 
 
Table A4: Detailed Description of the Control Variables 
Variable Definition 
female Dummy  for  females 
highschool  Dummy for individuals who finished higher secondary school with a university entrance 
qualification ("Fachhochschulreife" or "Abitur") 
apprenticeship  Dummy for individuals who finished an apprenticeship ("Lehre") 
highertechncol  Dummy for individuals who finished a higher technical college, a health care school, or 
civil service training ("Berufsschule", "Schule Gesundheitswesen", "Fachschule", 
"Meister", "Beamtenausbildung", or "Sonstige Ausbildung") 
university  Dummy for individuals who have a university degree 
age  Age of individual 
agesqr Age  squared 
prworkexp10
a  Years of full time work experience prior to the year of observation, divided by 10 
prunemexp
a  Years of unemployment experience prior to the year of observation 
disabled  Dummy for handicapped / physically challenged individuals 
german  Dummy for German nationality 
fatherse  Dummy for individuals whose father was self-employed when the respondents were 15 
years old 
nchild  Number of children under 17 in the household 
married  Dummy for married and not separated individuals. Omitted category for marital status is 
"single"/"widowed" 
separated  Dummy for married, but separated individuals 
divorced  Dummy for divorced individuals 
capincr1000  Real income from interests, dividends, and renting out in the year before the observation 
year in 1000 Euros, deflated to 2005 using the Consumer Price Index. 
duration
a  Tenure of current spell (self-employment, regular employment or 
unemployment/inactivity). For left-censored spells, the duration since the last job change 





motherabi  Dummy for individuals whose mother finished higher secondary school with a university 
entrance qualification 
fatherabi  Dummy for individuals whose father finished higher secondary school with a university 
entrance qualification 
Notes: 
a Uses information from the lifetime employment history in the SOEP. 
Dummy variables equal 1 if condition holds and 0 otherwise. 
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Supplementary Appendix 
Table SA1: Factor Analysis and Cronbach’s Alpha 
  Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Uniqueness 
trustpeople   -0.6100    0.6225 
canttrust   0.6348    0.5955 
cautionstrangers   0.4359    0.8087 
returnfavor     0.5235  0.7245 
returnhelp     0.6571  0.564 
returncostlyhelp     0.5368  0.6968 
revenge  0.7887    0.3686 
returndisadvantage  0.8204    0.3325 
offendback  0.6638    0.5547 
Constructed index  negative reciprocity  trust  positive reciprocity   
Cronbach’s  alpha  0.6171 0.8269 0.6233  
Notes: The upper panel of the table shows the rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
(principal factors method; oblique promax rotation). Absolute factor loadings below 0.3 are left blank. The lower 
panel presents Cronbach’s alpha (scale reliability coefficient) for the three constructed indices. See Table A1 for 
a detailed description of the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
 
Table SA2:  Full Regression Results in Comparison to Managers – Marginal Effects on the 
Stock 
  Aggregated Trust and Reciprocity Variables Personality Items with Additional Trust 
Items 
 Self-employment 
versus being a 
manager 
Self-employment 
with workers versus 
being a manager 
Self-employment 




with workers versus 
being a manager 
trust -0.0209**  -0.0300***     
 (0.0091)  (0.0078)    
positive reciprocity   0.0006   0.0073     
 (0.0098)  (0.0086)    
negative reciprocity   0.0066   0.0026     
 (0.0095)  (0.0081)    
returnfavor       0.0103   0.0027 
   (0.0105)  (0.0090) 
returnhelp       0.0081   0.0046 
   (0.0114)  (0.0102) 
returncostlyhelp     -0.0167    0.0020 
   (0.0114)  (0.0102) 
revenge     -0.0008 -0.0011 
   (0.0133)  (0.0116) 
returndisadvantage     -0.0001    0.0101 
   (0.0140)  (0.0118) 
offendback     0.0087  -0.0093 
   (0.0114)  (0.0096) 
trustpeople       0.0054   0.0074 
   (0.0114)  (0.0102) 
canttrust     -0.0183* -0.0138 
   (0.0110)  (0.0097) 
cautionstrangers       0.0036  -0.0079 
   (0.0101)  (0.0089) 
dfair     -0.0479**  -0.0426** 
   (0.0219)  (0.0190) 
dhelpful       0.0341   0.0151 
   (0.0216)  (0.0191) 
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dprofitfromstranger       0.0047  -0.0009 
   (0.0212)  (0.0185) 
numberfriends       0.0037   0.0050 
   (0.0092)  (0.0075) 
lendbelongings       0.0221**   0.0217** 
   (0.0102)  (0.0085) 
lendmoney     -0.0357*** -0.0293*** 
   (0.0103)  (0.0088) 
doorunlocked     -0.0223**  -0.0146* 
   (0.0093)  (0.0075) 
will_risk  -0.0182 -0.0064 -0.0185 -0.0046 
  (0.0154) (0.0124) (0.0158) (0.0126) 
will_risk_sq   0.0040***   0.0023*   0.0039***   0.0020* 
  (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0012) 
female 0.0813***  -0.0146  0.0844***  -0.0110 
  (0.0207) (0.0183) (0.0212) (0.0185) 
highschool  -0.0965*** -0.0765*** -0.0935*** -0.0750*** 
  (0.0247) (0.0214) (0.0252) (0.0215) 
apprenticeship -0.0610**  -0.0421*  -0.0614**  -0.0435* 
  (0.0262) (0.0224) (0.0267) (0.0225) 
highertechncol -0.0622**  -0.0392*  -0.0638**  -0.0414* 
  (0.0281) (0.0235) (0.0286) (0.0236) 
university  -0.3019*** -0.1829*** -0.2970*** -0.1815*** 
  (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0251) 
age 0.0056  0.0195**  0.0035  0.0174** 
  (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0086) 
agesq 0.0001  -0.0002  0.0001  -0.0001 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
prworkexp10 -0.1016***  -0.0392*  -0.0961***  -0.0349 
  (0.0254) (0.0237) (0.0258) (0.0238) 
prunempexp 0.0644***  0.0045  0.0630***  0.0018 
  (0.0133) (0.0104) (0.0134) (0.0105) 
disabled -0.1525***  -0.0658**  -0.1484***  -0.0635** 
  (0.0343) (0.0300) (0.0347) (0.0303) 
german -0.1004**  -0.0658 -0.1067**  -0.0643 
  (0.0486) (0.0463) (0.0503) (0.0483) 
fatherse  0.1062*** 0.1265*** 0.1023*** 0.1210*** 
  (0.0307) (0.0295) (0.0312) (0.0296) 
nchild  0.0213** 0.0192** 0.0211** 0.0175** 
  (0.0098) (0.0084) (0.0100) (0.0084) 
married -0.0049 0.0060  -0.0034 0.0075 
  (0.0244) (0.0218) (0.0246) (0.0218) 
divorced 0.0842**  0.0779**  0.0744*  0.0743* 
  (0.0387) (0.0386) (0.0392) (0.0386) 
capincr1000  0.0050*** 0.0042*** 0.0048*** 0.0040*** 
  (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
Year  dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Wald 2  422.608 263.895 433.852 271.210 
Log likelihood  -10262.049  -6835.099  -10018.735  -6675.153 
Mean  outcome  0.361091 0.219737 0.361238 0.220406 
Person-years   17857   14622   17548   14378 
Notes: Marginal effects after logit estimation, evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. For dummy 
variables, the effects of a discrete change from 0 to 1 are shown. Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. See Tables A1 and A4 for 
a detailed description of the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
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Table SA3: Probability of Employing Workers Conditional on Being Self-employed – Probit 
Coefficients (Selection Model for Binary Outcome) 
  Aggregated Trust and Reciprocity Variables 
– Probit Coefficients 











trust   0.0030  -0.1127***     
 (0.0176)  (0.0340)    
positive reciprocity  0.0053   0.0293     
 (0.0181)  (0.0340)    
negative reciprocity  -0.0214  -0.0326     
 (0.0178)  (0.0375)    
returnfavor     -0.0029  -0.0464 
   (0.0199)  (0.0361) 
returnhelp     -0.0163  -0.0168 
   (0.0211)  (0.0431) 
returncostlyhelp       0.0186   0.0872** 
   (0.0215)  (0.0443) 
revenge       0.0226 -0.0257 
   (0.0271)  (0.0539) 
returndisadvantage     -0.0046    0.1199** 
   (0.0274)  (0.0578) 
offendback     -0.0494**  -0.1606*** 
   (0.0224)  (0.0483) 
trustpeople       0.0110   0.0939** 
   (0.0206)  (0.0412) 
canttrust     -0.0155    0.0092 
   (0.0203)  (0.0414) 
cautionstrangers       0.0402**  -0.0656 
   (0.0178)  (0.0417) 
dfair     -0.0966**  -0.0707 
   (0.0391)  (0.0883) 
dhelpful       0.0115  -0.0055 
   (0.0398)  (0.0800) 
dprofitfromstranger       0.0998**   0.0246 
   (0.0418)  (0.0868) 
numberfriends       0.0013   0.0206 
   (0.0176)  (0.0356) 
lendbelongings       0.0341*   0.0590 
   (0.0200)  (0.0398) 
lendmoney     -0.0459**  -0.0606 
   (0.0189)  (0.0385) 
doorunlocked     -0.0706***  -0.0131 
   (0.0164)  (0.0383) 
will_risk   0.0055   0.0354  0.0057   0.0397 
  (0.0248) (0.0565) (0.0255) (0.0539) 
will_risk_sq   0.0086***  -0.0011   0.0080***  -0.0009 
  (0.0024) (0.0055) (0.0025) (0.0055) 
fatherabi   0.1728***     0.1490***   
  (0.0552)   (0.0553)  
motherabi   0.2184***     0.2116***   
  (0.0719)   (0.0732)  
Control  variables  yes yes yes yes 
   0.2297   0.3004 
   (0.3215)   (0.3669) 
Wald 2   220.029   259.361 
Log likelihood    -21983.989    -21433.148 
Person-years   70420    69211 
continued on the following page  30
Continued 
Notes: The table shows probit coefficients. Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% levels. The left two columns refer to the model using the 
aggregated variables on trust, positive reciprocity, and negative reciprocity, and the right two columns to the 
model using the single items. For each model, the selection equation appears in the left and the equation of the 
probability of having employees in the right column. We use the same control variables as in the preceding 
analysis. For better identification, we include the secondary schooling level of the respondent’s father and 
mother in the selection equation only. The parents’ schooling is expected to influence their children’s initial 
occupational choice, but not further entrepreneurial development once an adult has decided to be self-employed. 
The parents’ schooling levels are measured by dummy variables indicating if the parents obtained the higher 
secondary school degree, Abitur, which qualifies for university admission in Germany. Both variables have a 
positive and highly significant influence on selection. After having estimated the selection models, Wald tests 
indicates that the hypothesis that  = 0, i.e. the selection and the outcome equations are independent, cannot be 
rejected; the p-value is 0.49 using the aggregated indices and 0.44 using the single items. See Tables A1 and A4 
for a detailed description of the variables. 
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP 2000-08. 
 
Table SA4: Limited Sample 2005-2008 (Aggregated Index) – Marginal Effects 
 Stock  Entry  Exit 
trust03 0.0021 0.0011***  -0.0006 
 (0.0027)  (0.0004)  (0.0039) 
positive reciprocity  0.0011  -0.0004  -0.0072* 
 (0.0026)  (0.0004)  (0.0039) 
negative reciprocity  -0.0036  0.0003  -0.0008 
 (0.0026)  (0.0004)  (0.0044) 
will_risk04 -0.0023  -0.0002  -0.0058 
 (0.0038)  (0.0006)  (0.0071) 
will_risk04_sq 0.0014***  0.0001*  0.0009 
 (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0007) 
female -0.0366***  -0.0026***  0.0184* 
 (0.0060)  (0.0010)  (0.0099) 
highschool 0.0339*** 0.0031**  -0.0213* 
 (0.0083)  (0.0015)  (0.0117) 
apprenticeship -0.0209***  -0.0023**  0.0101 
 (0.0067)  (0.0011)  (0.0132) 
highertechncol 0.0084  0.0001  0.0141 
 (0.0073)  (0.0011)  (0.0142) 
university 0.0248***  0.0007  -0.0027 
 (0.0085)  (0.0013)  (0.0121) 
age 0.0145***  0.0013***  -0.0028 
 (0.0028)  (0.0004)  (0.0052) 
agesq -0.0001***  -0.0000***  0.0000 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001) 
prworkexp10 0.0040  0.0013  -0.0076 
 (0.0050)  (0.0009)  (0.0099) 
prunempexp -0.0047***  -0.0009***  0.0009 
 (0.0017)  (0.0003)  (0.0024) 
disabled -0.0354***  -0.0016  0.0223 
 (0.0070)  (0.0015)  (0.0239) 
german 0.0074  0.0023*  -0.0061 
 (0.0110)  (0.0012)  (0.0199) 
fatherse 0.0489***  0.0050**  -0.0061 
 (0.0117)  (0.0020)  (0.0131) 
nchild 0.0014  0.0001  0.0038 
 (0.0027)  (0.0004)  (0.0052) 
married -0.0145*  -0.0009 -0.0138 
 (0.0075)  (0.0011)  (0.0132) 
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divorced 0.0055  -0.0020* -0.0068 
 (0.0098)  (0.0012)  (0.0147) 
capincr1000 0.0008***  0.0000***  -0.0001 
 (0.0003)  (0.0000)  (0.0002) 
duration   -0.0026***  -0.0302*** 
  (0.0004)  (0.0047) 
dur_sq   0.0001***  0.0017*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0004) 
dur_cu   -0.0000**  -0.0000*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
notempl   -0.0003  
  (0.0020)   
duration_ne   0.0023*   
  (0.0013)   
dur_sq_ne   -0.0003   
  (0.0002)   
dur_cu_ne   0.0000   
  (0.0000)   
Year dummies  yes  yes  yes 
Wald 2  632.755 364.009 179.409 
Log likelihood  -8433.904  -1166.782  -570.937 
Mean outcome  0.095434  0.011463  0.088989 
Person-years 29832  21285  2225 
Notes: Marginal effects after logit estimation, evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. For dummy 
variables, the effects of a discrete change from 0 to 1 are shown. Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. In this table, only the trust 
measure from 2003 and the risk measure from 2004 are used. See Tables A1 and A4 for a detailed description of 
the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2005-08. 
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Table SA5: Probability of Being Self-Employed: Marginal Effects – Separate Regressions 
with Subsets of Trust and Reciprocity Items (SOEP 2000-2008) 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 4  Spec. 5  Spec. 7  Spec. 6  Spec. 3  Spec. 8  Spec. 9  Spec. 10 
returnfavor  0.0006       0.0002     
  (0.0030)       (0.0030)     
returnhelp  -0.0018       -0.0017     
  (0.0022)       (0.0022)     
returncostlyhelp  0.0021       0.0023     
  (0.0018)       (0.0018)     
revenge   0.0015      0.0016     
   (0.0019)      (0.0019)     
returndisadvantage   -0.0008      -0.0009     
   (0.0020)      (0.0020)     
offendback   -0.0030*      -0.0030**     
   (0.0015)      (0.0015)     
trustpeople    0.0017         
    (0.0036)         
canttrust   -0.0045         
    (0.0032)         
cautionstrangers    0.0084***         
    (0.0029)         
dfair
1     -0.0104**     -0.0100**   -0.0097** 
     (0.0043)     (0.0044)   (0.0043) 
dhelpful
1     0.0013     0.0015   0.0013 
     (0.0046)     (0.0046)   (0.0046) 
dprofitfromstranger
1     0.0207***     0.0201***   0.0154*** 
     (0.0056)     (0.0056)   (0.0054) 
numberfriends      0.0002    0.0003  0.0002  0.0003 
      (0.0005)    (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
lendbelongings       0.0033    0.0034  0.0036 
       (0.0023)    (0.0023)  (0.0023) 
lendmoney       -0.0089***    -0.0090***  -0.0082*** 
       (0.0027)    (0.0027)  (0.0027) 
doorunlocked       -0.0067***    -0.0067***  -0.0064*** 
       (0.0015)    (0.0015)  (0.0016) 
will_risk 0.0011  0.0010  0.0009 0.0014 0.0008 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0008 0.0012 
  (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
will_risk_sq 0.0009***  0.0010***  0.0010*** 0.0009*** 0.0010*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Control  variables  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
chi2  854.959 852.714 860.044 862.109 840.757 868.289 858.407 853.409 858.765 866.025 
ll  -18708.527 -18698.720 -18687.572 -18557.363 -18547.442 -18565.190 -18693.154 -18401.792 -18399.711 -18282.968 
ymean  0.086728 0.086728 0.086728 0.086968 0.086478 0.086644 0.086728 0.086759 0.086373 0.086682 
N  70865 70865 70865 70348 70353 70726 70865 69860 70230 69749 
Notes: Marginal effects after logit estimation, evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. For dummy variables, the effects of a discrete change from 0 to 1 are shown. 
Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. See Table A1 for a detailed description of 
the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
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Table SA6: Probability of Entry: Marginal Effects – Separate Regressions with Subsets of 
Trust and Reciprocity Items (SOEP 2000-2008) 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 4  Spec. 5  Spec. 7  Spec. 6  Spec. 3  Spec. 8  Spec. 9  Spec. 10 
returnfavor  0.0008       0.0004     
  (0.0006)       (0.0004)     
returnhelp  -0.0007*       -0.0005*     
  (0.0004)       (0.0003)     
returncostlyhelp  0.0003       0.0003     
  (0.0003)       (0.0002)     
revenge  0.0002      0.0002      
  (0.0002)      (0.0002)      
returndisadvantage  -0.0001      -0.0001      
  (0.0003)      (0.0003)      
offendback  -0.0001      -0.0001      
  (0.0002)      (0.0002)      
trustpeople   -0.0003          
   (0.0004)          
canttrust  0.0003          
   (0.0004)          
cautionstrangers   0.0006          
   (0.0004)          
dfair
1    -0.0004     -0.0004   -0.0004   
    (0.0006)     (0.0006)   (0.0006)   
dhelpful
1    0.0004     0.0004   0.0004   
    (0.0006)     (0.0006)   (0.0006)   
dprofitfromstranger
1    0.0021***     0.0021***   0.0017**   
    (0.0007)     (0.0007)   (0.0007)   
numberfriends     -0.0000    -0.0000  -0.0000  -0.0000   
     (0.0001)    (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)   
lendbelongings      -0.0004    -0.0004  -0.0004   
      (0.0003)    (0.0003)  (0.0003)   
lendmoney      -0.0004    -0.0004  -0.0003   
      (0.0003)    (0.0003)  (0.0003)   
doorunlocked      -0.0003    -0.0002  -0.0002   
      (0.0002)    (0.0002)  (0.0002)   
will_risk -0.0013**  -0.0006  -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
  (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
will_risk_sq 0.0003***  0.0002***  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Control  variables  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
chi2  388.452 750.705 757.303 741.544 751.485 749.098 756.039 749.869 754.937 751.752 
ll  -3534.961 -3285.246 -3281.814 -3245.639 -3258.080 -3266.820 -3282.509 -3222.553 -3239.836 -3215.294 
ymean  0.011556 0.011556 0.011556 0.011513 0.011555 0.011528 0.011556 0.011526 0.011525 0.011528 
N  59019 59019 59019 58540 58587 58898 59019 58127 58482 58031 
Notes: Marginal effects after logit estimation, evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. For dummy variables, the effects of a discrete change from 0 to 1 are shown. 
Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. See Table A1 for a detailed description of 
the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
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Table SA7: Probability of Exit: Marginal Effects – Separate Regressions with Subsets of 
Trust and Reciprocity Items (SOEP 2000-2008) 
  Spec. 1  Spec. 2  Spec. 4  Spec. 5  Spec. 7  Spec. 6  Spec. 3  Spec. 8  Spec. 9  Spec. 10 
returnfavor  0.0042       0.0020     
  (0.0052)       (0.0045)     
returnhelp  -0.0031       -0.0022     
  (0.0042)       (0.0037)     
returncostlyhelp  0.0006       0.0003     
  (0.0033)       (0.0027)     
revenge   0.0063**      0.0063**     
   (0.0027)      (0.0028)     
returndisadvantage   -0.0027      -0.0026     
   (0.0032)      (0.0033)     
offendback   -0.0009      -0.0010     
   (0.0028)      (0.0028)     
trustpeople    -0.0006         
    (0.0059)         
canttrust   0.0066         
    (0.0056)         
cautionstrangers    -0.0063         
    (0.0051)         
dfair
1     0.0008     0.0027   0.0029 
     (0.0081)     (0.0081)   (0.0081) 
dhelpful
1     0.0056     0.0057   0.0055 
     (0.0086)     (0.0087)   (0.0086) 
dprofitfromstranger
1     0.0091     0.0085   0.0093 
     (0.0082)     (0.0083)   (0.0086) 
numberfriends      -0.0020*    -0.0020*  -0.0021**  -0.0021** 
      (0.0010)    (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0010) 
lendbelongings       0.0003    -0.0005  0.0004 
       (0.0041)    (0.0041)  (0.0042) 
lendmoney       -0.0015    -0.0014  -0.0012 
       (0.0047)    (0.0047)  (0.0047) 
doorunlocked       0.0032    0.0036  0.0040 
       (0.0029)    (0.0029)  (0.0029) 
will_risk -0.0178***  -0.0152***  -0.0144**  -0.0151*** -0.0144**  -0.0153*** -0.0153*** -0.0150*** -0.0152*** -0.0156*** 
  (0.0068) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0058) 
will_risk_sq 0.0018***  0.0015***  0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0016*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Control  variables  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
chi2  123.841 284.112 279.029 273.270 278.147 280.830 284.254 275.450 283.066 283.034 
ll  -1652.222 -1576.333 -1577.696 -1569.028 -1567.024 -1571.034 -1576.092 -1557.192 -1558.689 -1551.447 
ymean  0.095221 0.095221 0.095221 0.094961 0.095865 0.094987 0.095221 0.095536 0.095631 0.095615 
N  5524 5524 5524 5497 5466 5506 5524 5443 5448 5428 
Notes: Marginal effects after logit estimation, evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables. For dummy variables, the effects of a discrete change from 0 to 1 are shown. 
Cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars (***/**/*) indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% levels. See Table A1 for a detailed description of 
the variables. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the SOEP 2000-08. 
 
 